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[M]ost of our models for information technology today are industrial
models. The notion of an office really is just a wholesale transposition
of industrial processes. We process words in the same way we process
metal to put into a car. And when you have a processing mentality,
a place for processing, like an office, is essential. But the moment we
abandon that processing model and go to stranger and newer models,
then the idea of having a physical place where you go and sit down
and have a desk and a stapler and all that becomes very quaint.,
INTRODUCTION
The notion of "going to work" may be an early casualty of the Digital
Revolution. Today, manufacturing is no longer the dominant model of work.2
Because many industries of the Information Age do not require heavy
machinery and infrastructure, the physical centralization of labor that was a
hallmark of the Industrial Revolution is waning. In mid-1994, a survey found
that over seventy percent of large employers offered some employees the
option of telecommuting-working at home while remaining connected to the
office by telephone, facsimile machine, or computer network. By the end of
the decade, the number of U.S. users of electronic mail is projected nearly to
triple from its 1993 level, in large part because of increased use by mobile
employees.4 Motivated by employers' desires to reduce real estate overhead, 5
1. Paul Saffo, a director of the Institute for the Future, Menlo Park, Cal., quoted in Joshua D. Macht
& Jeffrey L. Seglin, It's Off to Work We Go, INC., Oct. 1994, at 18, 18.
2. The most rapidly expanding part of the economy of the United States is the services sector, in
which employment is projected to grow at a modest but steady three percent per year between 1992 and
2005. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 413 (114th ed. 1994). In the same period, manufacturing employment is projected to decline at the
rate of 0.2% per year. Id.
3. URB. TRANSPORT NEws, July 21, 1994, quoted in Macht & Seglin, supra note 1, at 18.
4. Paul Taylor, E-mail: A Vital Tool with Flaws, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, Information Technology
Review, at I.
5. See John Handley, Work in Progress: A More Flexible, Mobile Office Is Evolving, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
21, 1994, § 16 (Real Estate), at 1, 9C (describing AT&T, Kodak, and Xerox plans to reduce office space
through telecommuting); The Virtual Office: Telecommuting Picks Up Speed, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 17, 1995, at 42, 42 (reporting that AT&T reduced office overhead by $80 million in 1994 by
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as well as to accommodate personal needs of employees, a new employment
setting is emerging: the (net)workplace.
Like the earlier transition from field to factory, the transition to the new
workplace is not without problems. Some workers have rushed to the
countryside, wooed by the promise of an end to rush hour, only to discover
that pure telecommuting engenders poor morale and feelings of isolation.6 At
the same time, both telecommuters and workers in traditional offices complain
that unbreakable electronic links to their work have eroded the last remaining
distinctions between work and nonwork time.7 Employers expect employees
to "overwork" if they want to get ahead.8
Yet despite the new context, traditional employment concerns remain. As
one commentator has noted:
Working in cyberspace will be, in many fundamental ways, radically
different than any sort of work humankind has ever done before. But
we can't forget that some of the basic issues will remain: fairness in
the workplace, privacy, health and safety, seniority, decent wages,
overtime, dignity and more. Cyberspace workers may be working in
a whole new frontier but in the end they remain workers with rights
to protect.9
How those rights will be protected is the concern of this Note. As workers
who have common wages, benefits, working conditions, projects, and
supervisors become geographically separated, they lose the opportunity to
discuss their concerns in the breakroom. The one common space in which they
can meet, despite their physical isolation, is cyberspace-often in the form of
an employer-owned and -maintained Local Area Network (LAN) into which
homebound employees telephone, a Wide Area Network (WAN) covering
multiple offices, or the Internet. Because this network technology is devoted
to improving communication, it is well suited for organizing widely dispersed
employees who report to the same management and have the same work
concerns but for whom isolation impedes organization through traditional
means.' In addition to its value for organized labor, network communication
increasing number of telecommuting employees and that roughly 12,000 people or 10% of its salaried U.S.
work force telecommute).
6. See David A. Fryxell, Telecommuting: Working at Home with the Use of Computers and Modems,
LINK-UP, May 1994, at 18, 18 (reporting low morale and productivity among Bell Telephone telecommuters
unless they retained ties to office); Michael A. Verespej, Communications Technology: Slave or Master?,
INDUSTRY WK., June 19, 1995, at 50 (noting isolation because of lack of "office chitchat").
7. Fryxell, supra note 6, at 18; Verespej, supra note 6, at 50; see also Marc Belanger, A Bill of Rights
for Workers in Cyberspace, CAN. DIMENSION, Dec. 1994-Jan. 1995, at 4, 6 (suggesting overtime pay for
on-line work to discourage expansion of work day).
8. Verespej, supra note 6, at 50.
9. Belanger, supra note 7, at 6.
10. See, e.g., NCR Corp., 313 N.L.R.B. 574 (1993). In this case, the Board noted that NCR field
engineers, who repaired computer equipment, were largely unorganized. Id. at 574. This may well have
been attributable to the fact that while engineers each reported to a district office, "they [were] assigned
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seems uniquely conducive to assisting employees who may band together
around timely concerns without forming long-term organizations, a group that
includes many white-collar workers." Yet, at present, whether employees
may take advantage of the tremendous potential of network communication in
order to discuss their employment concerns often depends on the whim of their
employers.' And the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the primary
legal mechanism that regulates employers' and employees' rights and
responsibilities in this changed environment, dates from a time when the
paradigmatic workplace was the factory. 3
The NLRA bears the unmistakable imprint of its industrial origins. Its
declaration of purpose states:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce
from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife
a specific area and customers, and normally operate[d] from their homes. Typically they [came] to the
district office only to attend monthly meetings or to make pickups or dropoffs, usually about once a week."
Id. at 575. If these workers had had electronic communications capability, their ability to use it for
organizational purposes would have dramatically increased their ability to act collectively. As one
practitioner counseling employers noted:
The use of E-mail in a union organizing campaign can be powerful because in a matter of
seconds, an employee supporting a union organizing drive can get its message out to many
potential voters. This group of potential voters now even includes telecommuters who were
often unknown to and virtually unreachable by the union.
Frank C. Morris, Jr., E-Mail Communications: The Next Employment Law Nightmare, CA30 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
571, 582 (1995).
Furthermore, difficulty in maintaining labor standards for workers at home has been a concern for
decades and has often led to outright bans on home work in order to avoid worker exploitation. See
Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945) (upholding Department of Labor ban on home work in seven
industries because of difficulty in enforcing labor standards). See generally Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus:
A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 149, 152 n.9 (1993)
(listing similar cases and advocating "mandatory statutory elected councils of employees who work at
home"). As more home workers become electronically linked, one could potentially avoid inefficient bright-
line bans on home labor by empowering employees to protect their own interests through cyberspace
collective action, using the same systems that give their employers the advantages of lower overhead and
thinner management.
11. As a result, network communications can be an important means of protecting the right to engage
in "other concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection" guaranteed by § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). Employees resort naturally to informal communication to discuss
their concerns, regardless of union presence. In light of the decline of unions in recent years, this nonunion
concerted activity is of growing importance for labor advocates. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 10 (suggesting
importance of nonunion concerted activity).
12. For example, a Canadian pizza delivery chain denied its unionized workers permission to use
company computers to access a labor movement computer network. These workers very rarely meet face-to-
face because they take telephone orders in their homes and enter the orders into a central computer using
employer-provided computers and modems. Belanger, supra note 7, at 4. By contrast, Alan Hyde has
reported that at least one high-technology company actively encourages its several thousand networked
employees to make suggestions and discuss work-related concerns on a company Bulletin Board System
(BBS). Company policies have been developed and changed as a result of suggestions made via the BBS.
Hyde, supra note 10, at 155-56.
13. Professor Hyde has noted that the automobile industry has served as the prototype for discussion
of labor law in the last 50 years. See Hyde, supra note 10, at 149, 192. He suggests that high-technology
industry will provide the paradigm for labor relations in the future. See id. at 149.
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and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality
of bargaining power between employers and employees.
4
Communication among employees has always been a prerequisite for achieving
this purpose. As an early National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) opinion
explained:
It is clear that employees cannot realize the benefits of the right to
self-organization guaranteed them by the Act, unless there are
adequate avenues of communication open to them whereby they may
be informed or advised as to the precise nature of their rights under
the Act and of the advantages of self-organization, and may have
opportunities for the interchange of ideas necessary to the exercise of
their right to self-organization. 5
When an employer rule "constitutes such a serious impediment to the freedom
of communication which is essential to the exercise of the right to self-
organization .... the right to self-organization must be held paramount, and
the rule give way."' 6
This Note argues that despite changes in workplace context, the underlying
values of the NLRA remain appropriate to protect the essential rights of
(net)workers. Fifty years of NLRA enforcement have been guided by the need
to maintain a delicate balance between the right of employees to act
collectively to improve their conditions and benefits and that of employers to
maintain production and discipline. Guaranteeing to employees who use
electronic communication technology in the course of their jobs the right to use
that technology for activity protected by the NLRA17 develops logically from
these precedents.t8
14. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
15. LeToumeau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1260 (1944), aff'd sub nom. Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 793 (1945). The Board went on to say:
It must also be noted that speech is not the only mode of communication by which self-
organization is effected, nor is it sufficient that this channel alone be free. Effective organization
requires the use of printed literature and of application and membership cards, and these modes
of communication are also protected by the Act.
Id. The principle of protecting effective communication, whatever its form, is fundamental to understanding
the rights of (net)workers to use employer-provided systems for labor purposes.
16. Id.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
18. This Note does not argue that employers must make electronic communications available to
workers who do not have access to the network in the normal course of their employment. The NLRA
balances employer and employee interests. "The employer may not affirmatively interfere with organization;
the union may not always insist that the employer aid organization." NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
This Note also accepts, for the sake of argument, the contours of protected concerted activity
developed in prior cases. For criticism of these contours, see, e.g., Hyde, supra note 10, at 168-69 & nn.
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To assure that the underlying purposes of the Act are fulfilled in an
economy in which physically centralized industry no longer predominates,
however, requires more than a mechanical application of existing labor law.
Justice Powell's warning about applying labor law precedents in new work
contexts should alert us to the dangers of uncritical application of such
precedents:
The rule of Republic Aviation was adopted in the context of labor
relations in industrial and manufacturing plants .... The latter part
of the Board's set of presumptions reflects the reasonable inference,
based on the Board's experience with the actual facts of industrial
life, that such employers will not have legitimate reasons to restrict
employees' activities on their own time, even if on company property.
The rationality found to exist in Republic Aviation, and therefore
the validity of the presumption, cannot be transferred automatically to
other workplaces, for to do so would sever the connection between
the inference and the underlying pfoof. 9
This Note heeds Powell's admonition to acknowledge the factual context of
work in enforcing labor law. To this end, it reexamines the jurisprudential tests
developed by the NLRB and the courts to achieve balance in the industrial
workplace and evaluates their appropriateness for the (net)workplace. 0 Part I
of the Note paints a picture of cyberspace and the (net)workplace by describing
developing technologies and their increased use by businesses. Part II sets forth
the legal framework governing employee communications, analyzing existing
labor law to expose the principles currently at work. Part III argues that these
principles promise (net)workers the right to communicate effectively at the
jobsite but that the presumptions developed in traditional workplaces are
inadequate to protect this right in the (net)workplace. Part IV proposes
alternative methods of accommodating employer and employee rights in light
of the realities of (net)work.
62-64; Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory
of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673 (1989).
19. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 510-11 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
20. What I undertake might be termed a modest exercise in "translation," a term I borrow from
Lawrence Lessig. Professor Lessig has employed the term most recently to discuss constitutional fidelity
200 years after the drafting of that document. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings:
Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding]; see also Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). For the genealogy of the term and its close
relation to views of dynamic statutory interpretation, see Lessig, Understanding, supra, at 400 n.26.
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I. PICTURINoG THE (NET)WORKPLACE: TAKING CYBERSPACE SERIOUSLY
Although a pure (net)workplace, one with no physical component, exists
only on paper today,2' the shift to networking is underway even where
employees still share office space. At least one company has eliminated most
traditional methods of communication from its offices: Sun Microsystems has
no phone directory, no public-address system, and no memo pads or stationery;
instead, its employees each receive an average of 160 e-mail messages a day,
for a company total of about two million messages daily?2 Although such
exclusive use of electronic communication is not yet common, a recent survey
of fifty Fortune 1000 companies found that more than fifty-five percent of
their employees had electronic mail.23 E-mail usage is prevalent across
industries. 24 Moreover, the fact that workers in their late twenties and early
thirties use e-mail most frequently suggests that the trend toward greater use
of electronic communications will continue in the decades ahead? 5
Although e-mail is the type of electronic communication most often used
by businesses at present, the ever-expanding repertoire of network technologies
offers many other potentially valuable forms. Many of these network
applications refute the idea that electronic communication is merely another
replacement for memos, an alternative to phone or fax. Bulletin Board
Systems, Internet newsgroups, and other "message bases" provide fora for
group discussions of every imaginable topic; they allow participants to read the
remarks of all other participants and then to append their own reactions to the
"threads" of developing public commentary or, often, to respond privately to
individuals.26 Participants can often exchange software or graphics files, as
21. For one vision of future (net)work, see KEVIN KELLY, OUT OF CONTROL: THE RISE OF NEo-
BIOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION 184-202 (1994). See also Alice LaPlante, A Look into the Labs: Distributed
Computing in the Next Millennium and How It Will Affect the Way You Work, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 1,
1995, at 34 (forecasting future business environment).
22. Verespej, supra note 6, at 48.
23. Taylor, supra note 4, at 1 (citing report by Forrester Research).
24. As of August 1995, more than 50% of workers in the transportation, manufacturing, and business
services industries in the United States used e-mail at least once a month. Yvonne Chiu, E-Mail Gives Rise
to the E-Wail, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1995, at D1 (graph). Over 30% of health care workers and over 20%
of tradespeople used e-mail at least once a month. Id. Although the greatest inroads have been made in
white-collar jobs, electronic communication is not limited to that sector of the workforce. Northern Telecom
has erected multimedia kiosks on the factory floor at its Brampton, Ontario, telecommunications switch
manufacturing plant to keep its 2400 line workers better informed about company business. Martin Slofstra,
Northern Telecom Is Taking Multimedia to Its Natural Next Step, COMPUTING CAN., Feb. 16, 1994, at S9.
In the future, factory workers may have access to the Internet, individual e-mail accounts, or BBSs through
line-side network terminals.
25. Chiu, supra note 24, at D1.
26. Edward A. Cavazos and Gavino Morin use the term "public messaging system" to refer generically
to systems that allow participants to read and respond to messages posted by others but do not contain
individually addressed, private messages. I use their term "message base" to refer to any forum for posting
and reading messages accessible by a group. Message bases typically group messages into "threads" formed
by all the successive responses to a given message. Where such a message base is part of a larger network
also containing individual e-mail accounts, participants often can respond to comments with individual
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well as simply leave verbal "posts." 27 Real-time communication is also
possible: Internet Relay Chat (IRC) lets participants all over the world type out
a continuing dialogue on many "channels," each devoted to a single topic, and
business computer conferences are not far behind. 8
(Net)working produces more than new forms of correspondence, however.
"Groupware" allows people at different geographic locations to access and
work together on databases, documents, and spreadsheets. 29 Multi-User
Dungeons (MUDs) go even further; in these all-text applications, participants
not only converse in real time, but actually construct the environment around
them by adding lasting descriptions of objects and places that later participants
may encounter and use.30 As more of these applications are adapted for
business, workers routinely will be able not just to correspond, but also to
interact, manipulating both data and "objects" as their communications
themselves define virtual space. Because these more sophisticated business
applications are still nascent, this Note concentrates on the examples of e-mail
and message bases, which will likely remain important in future (net)working.
Nonetheless, the basic concerns explored are relevant to adapting the NLRA
to the wider spectrum of network applications. For workers who jointly prepare
projects without meeting in the same geographic location, what is at stake in
envisioning how the NLRA will apply to the (net)workplace is a right to
communicate in a new work territory: cyberspace. 31 Like the factories of the
e-mail messages as well as with posts to the group forum. See EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN,
CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD 6 (1994).
27. See, e.g., DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 235, 270-71 (1994).
28. See id. at 508-11. See generally David Petrie, Telecommuting Adds New Dimension to Workplace,
ORANGE COUNTY BUS. J., Oct. 16, 1995, § I, at 23 (describing growing use of Internet by telecommuters).
29. See LaPlante, supra note 21, at 34. An extremely popular example of such software is Lotus's
Notes.
30. The term "Multi-User Dungeon" reveals the roots of MUDs in interactive sword and sorcery
games. MUDs for such fantasy games remain very popular today, see, e.g., Ilsa Godlovitch, Jackal Takes
Dragonfly to Be His Bride, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 28, 1995, at 16 (describing popular adventure MUD),
but MUDs can be put to educational and professional use as well. Anyone with Internet access can
participate in MicroMUSE (Multi-User Simulation Environment), an educational MUD run out of
computers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. MicroMUSE includes a mission to Mars, a sailing
trip, logic puzzles with knights and knaves, a virtual space station where science experiments may be
conducted, and other environments, all designed by and for users from elementary school to the post-
graduate level. See DERN, supra note 27, at 438-41. Several companies are exploring the business potential
of MUDs, potentially integrating graphics and videoconferencing technologies into the MUD structure. See
LaPlante, supra note 21, at 34 (reporting that Xerox PARC and Electric Communities are developing
business applications for MUDs). In the future, combining computer simulation technology, such as that
used to design aircraft, and the interactive environment of a MUD, workers may build and test almost
anything together in their cyberspace labs while remaining at home in their pajamas.
31. Onejournalist has already painted this picture, arguing that electronic mail, computer conferencing,
groupware, and even the Internet, "are simply entry points into cyberspace-that realm of activity reached
by people with their computers." Belanger, supra note 7, at 4. He writes:
If you're interested in the future of work you should be interested in cyberspace. Because in the
not so distant future, millions of people will be cyberspace workers.
Already there are thousands of people working part-time, and some even full-time, in
cyberspace. The Internet for example, that huge global network of computer systems, has some
20 million users, and many of them are using the Internet for work purposes. Meanwhile,
according to Toronto-based Evans Research, there are 2,725,300 business computers plugged
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Industrial Age, this workplace is a uniquely appropriate place to discuss the
concerns that are the subjects of collective bargaining.32
II. THE TRADITIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Having provided a glimpse of the (net)workplace, I turn now to the legal
framework of employee communications. Before examining the case law, I
begin with § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act and the agency that
interprets it.
A. Protected Activities: § 7 of the NLRA
The philosophical heart and soul of the NLRA appears in its § 7:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a)(3) of this title.33
While the Act enumerates other specific unfair labor practices, the fundamental
unfair practice which both employers and labor organizations are prohibited
from engaging in is interference with the § 7 rights of any covered
employee.34 Traditionally, § 7 has been viewed as protecting three types of
into Canadian offices. Of these, 62 percent are attached to Local Area Networks (LAN). And
LANs are the shores of cyberspace. If you are on a LAN, and therefore able to exchange
messages or share databases, you're in cyberspace. Welcome to humankind's newest frontier
and its latest workplace.
Id.
32. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974) ("The place of work is a place uniquely
appropriate for dissemination of views concerning the bargaining representative and the various options
open to the employees.").
33. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
34. See id. § 158(a)(1) (interference with § 7 rights is unfair labor practice for employers); id. §
158(b)(1) (interference with § 7 rights is unfair labor practice for labor organizations).
Not all employees qualify for the Act's protection. Some transportation workers, including railroad
workers and airplane pilots, are covered under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). Agricultural
workers, independent contractors, and "supervisors" are not covered by the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1994). Nor does it apply to federal, state, or local governments. Id. § 152(2). The omission of government
employees excludes from the Act's ambit many of the workplaces in which electronic communications are
already best established and most useful for uniting physically dispersed communities of workers.
Nonetheless, the NLRA does cover many white-collar and professional workers, both those who have
traditionally formed unions, such as clerical workers, and those who have not, such as engineers and
accountants.
Many of the (net)workers with whom this Note is concerned are white-collar workers in service fields
who have not commonly organized in the past. One hurdle for some of the most technologically advanced
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activity: union organizing by employees, collective bargaining and preparation
therefor by established unions, and "other concerted activities for the purpose
of... mutual aid or protection, 35 usually considered to cover activities in
nonunionized workplaces, often prior to an organizing campaign.36 Whether
the employees are part of a labor organization as that term is understood in the
statute, however, "makes no difference, for, as employees, [they] have a
protected right to act concertedly as individuals to improve their wages, hours,
and working conditions. '37 These individual rights depend upon "concerted
activity"-ordinarily more than one employee acting toward the same
end3 3 -which in turn depends fundamentally on the right of employees to
communicate. 39 From the beginning, many disputes have arisen over how,
when, where, and by whom this communication may take place.
B. Interpreting the Act: The National Labor Relations Board
The resolution of these disputes is the responsibility of the administrative
body charged with primary enforcement of the NLRA, the National Labor
Relations Board, the members of which are appointed by the President. The
Board spends most of its time adjudicating labor disputes and thus sets its
policies primarily through quasi-judicial opinions rather than through
administrative rulemaking.40 Thus, in the course of adjudicating individual
workers is the nonstatutory exclusion of "managerial" employees from § 7 protection. This exception, a
product of administrative and judicial interpretation, is far from clearly defined. The Supreme Court has
described managerial as those who "represent] management interests by taking or recommending
discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy." NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444
U.S. 672, 683 (1980); see also NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1782
(1994) (reciting similar definition). This is not synonymous with the exclusion for supervisors and may
seem to strip of protection many professional employees otherwise covered by the Act. In addition, it may
have severe ramifications for nonhierarchical work teams in which all members participate in suggestions
and peer review. For a brief critique of the managerial-employee exclusion, see Hyde, supra note 10, at
166-67.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
36. Charles Morris has dubbed these "other" protected concerted activities "pre-organizational"
activities, even while recognizing that they may occur in workplaces where employees have no desire to
organize formally. See Morris, supra note 18, at 1677 n.17. Alan Hyde has criticized this traditional,
evolutionary view of the activities protected by § 7. He argues that the decline of unions has exposed the
independent importance of concerted activity for mutual aid and protection among workers whose group
actions are event-driven and unlikely to lead to organization. See Hyde, supra note 10, at 164-65.
37. Northeastern Univ., 235 N.L.R.B. 858, 865 (1978). In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978),
the Supreme Court affirmed that concerted activity for mutual aid or protection is guaranteed the same
presumptions as labor organizing or bargaining.
38. For a discussion of circumstances in which a single employee's action may be protected concerted
activity, see Morris, supra note 18, at 1702-04, 1713-22. Morris emphasizes that a single employee who
attempts to communicate with another employee for a protected purpose is exercising his right to engage
in concerted activity, regardless of the other employee's reaction or receptivity, and thus must be protected.
See id.
39. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
40. Although the NLRB is authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1994) to promulgate rules through the
informal "notice and comment" procedures specified in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1994), it has used this power very rarely. In the last eight years, it has promulgated one major rule, which
defines bargaining units in health care facilities, Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First Rulemaking: An
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disputes, the Board often makes policy changes that reflect its political tenor.
As with the decisions of other administrative agencies, courts afford its
interpretations considerable deference;4' hence, the Board's contribution to the
development of doctrine is crucial.42
To maintain the balance between workers' rights and employers'
prerogatives required by the NLRA, through years of case law the NLRB has
articulated a series of presumptions that govern whose rights-employers' or
employees'-will be protected by default. These presumptions, based on
experiential assumptions about the nature of the workplace and the interests to
be protected, establish the starting position for equitable bargaining. Under
current law developed in traditional industrial settings, different rules govern
employees and nonemployees, solicitation and distribution, activities in work
areas and in nonwork areas.43
C. General Principles Governing Employee Communication
Under current labor law, two major types of presumption have developed
to govern employee communication rights. In Subsection 1 below, I discuss the
Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 276 (1991), and has proposed a second important rule
governing the spending of union dues, Scott A. Zebrak, Comment, The Future of NLRB Rulemaking:
Analyzing the Mixed Signals Sent by the Implementation of the Health Care Bargaining Unit Rule and by
the Proposed Beck Union Dues Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 125, 126-27 (1994). This recent increase
in rulemaking activity is far from predictive of the Board's future inclinations, however. The possibility
of NLRB rulemaking is discussed further in Part IV.
The Supreme Court has approved this adjudicative policymaking in general. See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1947) (agency may fill interstices in its statute by adjudication as well as by
rulemaking). Nonetheless, approval has sometimes been uneasy. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 294-95 (1974), the Court upheld the Board's general right to change policy through adjudication while
remanding for reconsideration of its specific change in the treatment of buyers. The divided Court in NLRB
v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), gave two different rationales for upholding the Board's
decision in the case. Justice Fortas, joined by Justices Warren, Stewart, and White, acknowledged agency
power to change policy through adjudication but rejected the Board's ability to avoid requirements of the
APA through this method, id. at 764-65 (plurality opinion), while Justice Black, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, acknowledged the agency right to choose between rulemaking and adjudication but required
that changes in policy announced in case law be incident to the decision before the Board in order to be
enforceable, id. at 770-72 (concurring opinion).
41. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding
that, where gaps exist in a statute, courts must defer to reasonable interpretations by agency designated to
implement statute).
42. As Professor Winter has noted, court approval of an NLRB interpretation may sometimes cause
one reasonable interpretation of the Act to become locked in as the necessary interpretation of the Act,
freezing Board policy and limiting the Board's flexibility. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of
Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 53, 73-73.
43. This Note assumes that the activities it discusses are carried out by employees of the company
whose network is used. The language of the statute confers rights on employees, and the Supreme Court
has held that rights of nonemployees to communicate with employees on company property, even in an
attempt to assist in organizing labor, are significantly weaker than those of employees themselves. See
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992) (allowing employer to ban nonemployee union
organizers from its property); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (allowing




presumptions regarding the time of communications, and in Subsection 2, I
examine the limits the NLRB and the courts have imposed on the places where
employees may engage in oral solicitation and distribution of written materials.
1. Time Restrictions
In the granddaddy of NLRA cases, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,44
employees at two large industrial plants that produced materials for the Army
had been fired after distributing union materials to fellow employees on
company property during nonwork time, in violation of their employers'
longstanding, nondiscriminatory policies forbidding solicitation.45 In both
cases, the NLRB had found that employee rights had been violated.46 The
Supreme Court established that the NLRB's fundamental task in applying the
Act's general standards to myriad factual situations is to balance "the
undisputed right of self-organization assured to employees under the Wagner
Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in
their establishments." 47 In striking such a balance between employer and
employee rights, the Republic Aviation Court established several important
principles. First, the fact that the employers were exerting control over their
own property was not dispositive. "It is not every interference with property
rights that is within the Fifth Amendment... [.] Inconvenience, or even some
dislocation of property rights, may be necessary in order to safeguard the right
to collective bargaining."4  Second, the possibility that employees could
contact each other through other means was irrelevant to the weighing of
interests.49 While later cases permitted the exclusion of nonemployee
organizers absent proof that there were no other means of contact, the Act's
specific grant of rights to employees guaranteed their ability to communicate
44. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
45. Id. at 795-96.
46. Id. at 795, 797.
47. Id. at 797-98.
48. Id. at 802 n.8 (quoting LeToumeau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1259-60 (1944)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
49. The Court explicitly noted that other avenues of communication were present: "Neither in the
Republic nor the Le Tourneau cases can it properly be said that there was evidence or a finding that the
plant's physical location made solicitation away from company property ineffective to reach prospective
union members." Id. at 798-99. Furthermore, after NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956),
in which the Court noted that the Act itself produced a "distinction between rules of law applicable to
employees and those applicable to nonemployees" that was "one of substance," id. at 113, and thus
restricted nonemployee access to company property, the Board interpreted this distinction as an affirmative
statement of employee rights to engage in protected communication on employer property regardless of the
proven availability of alternative means. See also Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 622 (1962)
(interpreting as corollary of Babcock & Wilcox that employees may distribute literature on company
property, subject to reasonable restrictions; fact that nonemployees had successfully distributed literature
in area just outside property was irrelevant).
19961 1649
The Yale Law Journal
with each other without requiring them to show similar hardship.50 Third,
proof that the no-solicitation rule at issue predated union activity and was
uniformly enforced against all solicitors did nothing to mitigate the fact that
a prohibition of union solicitation on the employees' own time violated the Act
by discouraging membership in a labor organization.5 1 Nonetheless, while the
Court emphasized that employees could determine how to spend their time off
the clock, employers had the right to exercise control over their employees
during work time in order to ensure production. 2 Agreeing that the rights of
employers and employees could thus be accommodated, the Court approved
the NLRB's presumption that employees may engage in protected concerted
activity on company property during nonwork time, absent proof by the
employer that restrictions are necessary to maintain production or discipline. 3
2. Place Restrictions: Solicitation vs. Distribution
While Republic Aviation establishes a right to engage in concerted activity
on nonwork time on the employer's property, it does not confront the question
of how much or what portions of an employer's property must be made
accessible. Applying the basic balancing of employer and employee rights
identified in Republic Aviation, subsequent NLRB decisions have approved
additional employer restrictions limiting the locations in which employee
communications may take place. The most important of these is the general
presumption that distribution of written materials may be limited to nonwork
areas.
54
The Board classifies traditional communication into two modes: oral
solicitation and distribution of written materials. The effects of these modes on
the physical environment of the workplace are presumed to be quite different.
Spoken communication ordinarily does not affect the employee's physical
surroundings. Distribution of literature, on the other hand, "because it
carries the potential of littering the employer's premises, raises a hazard to
50. The focus on the rights of employees, the explicit subject of the NLRA, led to the distinction in
later cases between the rights of employees and of nonemployee union organizers who seek access to
company property to reach employees. Superior convenience of reaching employees at work is not
sufficient to justify mandating that employers grant access to strangers. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S.
527 (1992); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105. Such individuals must show effectively that they have
no other way of reaching the target employees, as, for example, when the employees live in isolated timber
camps where even the housing and recreational areas are owned by the company. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lake
Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948) (union organizers may enter bunkhouses where
loggers live on company property, but company has legitimate interest in enforcing curfew); NLRB v.
Cities Serv. Oil Co., 122 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1941) (union representatives granted access to oil tankers to
investigate sailor grievances).
51. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 805.
52. Id. at 803 n.10.
53. Id. at 803-04 & n.10.
54. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491-93 & n.10 (1978) (following Stoddard-Quirk
Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962)).
55. See Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
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production whether it occurs on working time or nonworking time. 56
Furthermore, in the Board's view, "[t]he distinguishing characteristic of
literature as contrasted with oral solicitation ... is that its message is of a
permanent nature and that it is designed to be retained by the recipient for
reading or re-reading at his convenience. Hence, the purpose is satisfied so
long as it is received. 57
Weighing the potential threats to production, safety, or discipline against
employees' right to communicate, the Board created the presumption that
solicitation may be conducted anywhere on nonwork time, but distribution may
be prohibited even on nonwork time unless limited to nonwork areas such as
parking lots and cafeterias.58 As with the time presumption, an employer may
further restrict the location of employee communications if it sets forth
legitimate reasons related to production and discipline. Later cases have
revealed that many of the special business needs that justify further restrictions
on employee exercise of § 7 rights are related to the effect that the content of
the communication will have on its audience, especially nonemployees who
might come into contact with it. Again, assumptions are made: that solicitation,
despite its general intimacy, may be accidentally overheard, or that distribution
runs the risk of leaving provocative materials where they may be found
accidentally by patrons. 9
D. Deviation from the Presumptions: Other Labor Law Principles
Although the time and place presumptions purport to draw neat lines
dividing the instances in which employers may restrict § 7 conduct from those
in which they may not, their rigid application would at times endanger the
fundamental values of the Act, even in the traditional workplace context for
which they were developed. The Board has attempted to avoid such results.
For example, so as not to severely limit one direct exercise of § 7
rights-electing a union-the NLRB classifies distribution of union cards as
solicitation, allowing it to occur in work areas, although such activity involves
physical objects that might litter the workplace.60 The fact that employers
56. Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.L.R.B. at 619.
57. Id. at 620.
58. Id. at 620-21.
59. See May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 980-81 (1944) (noting that clerks may be prohibited
from discussing union matters at any time on sales floor where customers might overhear them); Beth Israel
Hosp., 437 U.S. at 503-04 & n.23 (noting hospital workers may be prohibited from leaving pamphlets
discussing their complaints about understaffing in area where patients might read them).
60. Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.L.R.B. at 620 n.6, cited in Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,493
n.10 (1978), The Stoddard-Quirk majority, basing this distinction presumably on the fact that such a
signature card must be returned to be counted, declared that "the situation where an employee is asked to
sign an authorization card" was wholly distinguishable from distribution. It criticized the dissent, which
would have subjected all distribution to the same rules as solicitation, stating, "[o]ur dissenting colleagues
exploit a semantic gambit by analogizing the solicitation of signatures on authorization cards to the
distribution of 'literature."' Stoddard-Quirk, 138 N.L.R.B. at 620 n.6.
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may justify more severe restrictions than those allowed by the temporal and
spatial presumptions by establishing legitimate needs related to production and
discipline also demonstrates that the categories of permitted and forbidden
behavior may be forced to yield in order to uphold the purposes of the Act. In
several situations, in fact, the Board has entirely collapsed or ignored its
presumptions, sometimes to the benefit of employees and sometimes to that of
employers.
1. Pro-employee: Prohibiting Discriminatory Conduct
Many of the deviations from the presumptions operate in favor of
employers. For example, although employers may expand restrictions on
employee § 7 rights to cover nonwork times and places by demonstrating
legitimate business needs, employees can never invalidate a ban on such
activities on company time or on the work floor by proving that their actions
have not actually harmed productivity or discipline. Nonetheless, limits on
employers' freedom to curb employee rights exist. Chief among these is the
prohibition on discriminatory conduct. Where an employer allows some
nonwork uses of its property, it may not prevent employees from using the
property to the same extent for § 7 purposes.6' This is true even where the
basic presumptions have been violated. For example, in one recent case, the
Board held that where an employer's rule prohibiting solicitation was not
enforced against employees who solicited for football pools and similar
nonwork purposes during work hours, an employee labor organizer could not
be fired for discussing the union, even though some such conversations took
place on company time.62 Differential treatment often indicates antilabor
animus and constitutes discrimination against labor activity, in violation of the
Act.
2. Pro-employer: Blanket Prohibitions
Where differential treatment has not been at issue, however, the Board has
at times upheld extremely broad prohibitions on access to fellow employees.
In GTE Lenkurt, Inc.,63 it ruled that an employer could forbid off-duty
employees to remain on the premises of the business for any purpose if this
61. See, e.g., Storer Communications, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 1056 (1989) (union is entitled to post own
minutes of meetings with management on bulletin board where management posted its version; employees
also posted personal notices there); Northeastern Univ., 235 N.L.R.B. 858 (1978) (denial of access to
meeting rooms outside of work hours constituted violation where other employee groups were able to
schedule meetings); May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944) (Act violated where no-solicitation rule
was enforced against union but another organization allowed to solicit, even during working hours).
62. Willamette Indus., Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1992).
63. 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973).
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prohibition was uniformly applied and not motivated by anti-union bias.6 In
accord with Republic Aviation, the Board found that rules specifically
prohibiting solicitation and distribution in the plant and parking lot during
nonwork times in which the employee was nonetheless legitimately on the
company property-presumably during breaks or immediately prior to
work-violated the Act where no production, safety, or disciplinary reason
necessitated the prohibition. 65 However, the Board likened "an off-duty
employee who seeks to enter' 66 the employer's premises to organize to a
nonemployee, whose rights are significantly narrower than an employee's
rights.67 The Board stated:
[T]o require an employer to open his premises for union activities to
off-duty employees is, in fact, to compel him to make available an
additional means of communication, one which we believe he need
not afford them. For, in our view, there is no significant diminution
of the employee rights by such a no-access rule, inasmuch as the
Board and courts protect the right to engage in union activities during
the normal period of employee association and communication; i.e.,
during nonwork periods when employees are on the premises in
connection with their jobs.68
Tvo dissenters sharply criticized the majority, noting that the rule "has the
effect of forbidding employees on Respondent's three shifts to engage in such
activity in nonwork areas at any time except during their own 'breaks' and
immediately before and after their own shifts. 69
While the NLRB has never expressly overruled GTE Lenkurt, in Tri-
County Medical Center, Inc.,7 it echoed the reasoning of the GTE Lenkurt
dissent and limited the prior decision "to prevent undue interference with the
rights of employees under § 7 of the Act freely to communicate their interest
in union activity to those who work on different shifts.,,71 The Board wrote:
[I]n order to effectuate the policies of the Act .... such a [no-access]
rule is valid only if it ... limits access solely with respect to the
interior of the plant and other working areas .... [E]xcept where
64. Id. at 922.
65. Id. at 921 n.4.
66. Id. at 921 (emphasis added). The Board characterized the employee covered by the upheld rule
in this way, although nothing in the facts indicated that the employees in question were in fact ones who
sought to enter the premises while off-duty rather than to remain after work or to return earlier than
necessary when reporting for work. The rule would prohibit employees from being or. the property in all
of these situations.
67. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 541 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
68. GTE Lenkurt, 204 N.L.R.B. at 922.
69. Id. (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976).
71. Id. at 1089.
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justified by business reasons, a rule which denies off-duty employees
entry to parking lots, gates, and other outside nonworking areas will
be found invalid. 2
E. "Effective" Communication
The Board's decisions regarding nondiscriminatory prohibitions of
employee access to employer facilities, even on nonwork time, may appear
grave for the claims of (net)workers. Employers will protest that mandating
access to e-mail is "to compel [the employer] to make available an additional
means of communication." 73 Even the softened stance of Tri-Country, with
its reliance on interior/exterior distinctions to disallow the strictest uniform
prohibitions, gives little comfort to (net)workers, for one cannot easily identify
the parking lots of cyberspace. Fortunately for (net)workers, another body of
case law offers protection against an employer who so limits the location and
times of communication as to make the employees' rights meaningless.
Although it upheld the Board's general presumptions regarding nonwork
times and places, the Supreme Court emphasized in Beth Israel Hospital v.
NLRB74 that "the right of employees to self-organize and bargain
collectively ... necessarily encompasses the right effectively to communicate
with one another regarding self-organization at the jobsite."75 Because of
concerns that employee solicitation and distribution activities could disrupt the
hospital's delivery of patient care, Beth Israel Hospital had limited labor
activity to locker rooms and adjacent bathrooms that were accessible only to
employees. In nonwork areas that were open to the public, including the
cafeteria and coffee shop, such activities were prohibited.76 Noting that only
some of the locker rooms were accessible to all of the hospital employees, the
Court found that restriction of employee communications to these areas denied
their right to exercise their § 7 rights effectively. The Court remarked that the
hospital itself did not ordinarily use the locker area to communicate with
employees but did use the cafeteria for official notices.77 On the other hand,
although the Court voiced some doubt regarding the employer's need to protect
72. Id.
73. See GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921, 922 (1973).
74. 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
75. Id. at 491 (emphases added). While Beth Israel involved formal labor organization, Eastex, Inc.
v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978), decided the same day, established that employees may engage in other
concerted activities "for mutual aid or protection," subject to the same restrictions as self-organization. Id.
at 572-74.
76. Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 486-87.
77. Id. at 489-90. The Court also noted that the hospital had allowed other nonwork solicitation, such
as a United Way fund drive, in the cafeteria entrance. Id. at 490. This could provide an independent ground
for allowing labor access, since as we have seen, see supra Subsection II.D.I, discriminatory treatment is
prohibited by the Act.
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patients by preventing their exposure to lal~or arguments, the Court did not find
this justification for the additional restriction to be pretextual.7' Rather, it
agreed that the Board could, on balance, find that the harm to employees
caused by the ban was greater than the harm to patients that it averted. The
Court sought a careful equilibrium. It noted:
[T]he availability of one part of a health-care facility for
organizational activity might be regarded as a factor required to be
considered in evaluating the permissibility of restrictions in other
areas of the same facility. That consideration is inapposite here,
however, where the only areas in which organizational rights are
permitted is not conducive to their exercise.79
The Court upheld the decision to grant employees the right to use the cafeteria
for concerted activity while leaving open the possibility that a more restrictive
rule, such as one "requiring face-to-face distribution rather than leaving
literature on a table accessible to all," would strike an adequate balance of
employee rights with the employer's "legitimate desire to avoid having
potentially upsetting literature read by patients." 80 Thus, the Court established
that, although a legitimate business need to restrict nonwork communication
access will justify some limitation, such limitation must not compromise
meaningful employee exercise of § 7 rights. This principle has great import as
we consider the balance of employee communication rights and employer
business needs in cyberspace.
I. LAW IN THE (NET)WORKPLACE
The NLRB thus far has decided only one case involving employee e-mail
access, and that case was resolved on straightforward antidiscrimination
grounds. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,8t the Board held that an
employer had discriminated against bargaining unit employees, in violation of
their § 7 rights, by prohibiting them from using e-mail to distribute union
literature and notices.8 2 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) had found that,
in addition to authorizing specific employee committees 83 to send notices and
solicit concerns over the system, the company allowed employees to send
messages "to sometimes hundred[s] of other terminals," ranging from notices
to poems to discourses on boredom, drugs, Federal Express, TV programs, and
78. Id. at 502-03.
79. Id. at 505.
80. Id. at 504 n.23.
81. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
82. Id. at 897.
83. These were found to be company-dominated labor organizations, in violation of § 8(a)(2) of the
Act. Id.
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a host of other nonwork topics.' Because he had found the denial of union
use under these circumstances to be clearly discriminatory, the ALJ had
ordered the employer to grant the union access to the e-mail system but had
declined to rule on "whether the Union would otherwise be entitled to use this
common means of plant communications for contacting the bargaining unit
employees it represents. 85 The Board affirmed the AL's ruling but,
determining that the wording of his remedy for the discriminatory exclusion
was too broad, required only that union access be commensurate with that
granted to other employees.86 Thus, it left the employer the option of closing
all of its network to nonbusiness use, leaving a very real question as to the
availability of access under a uniform prohibition.
The possibility that an employer's tolerance of personal network use will
open it to a requirement of wholesale use for labor purposes is likely to
encourage employers to institute draconian prohibitions on all personal use,
particularly in light of the potential power of the electronic communications
medium. In fact, one practitioner has warned employers: "If a corporation
allows its employees to use E-mail for personal purposes, the company will be
hard pressed to justify a ban on pro-union messages."88 As a prophylactic
measure, he recommended that companies establish and enforce uniform
prohibitions on all nonbusiness uses of the electronic communications
system. 89
May employers institute a nondiscriminatory total prohibition on nonwork
use of electronic communications? To answer this question, we must return to
Beth Israel, which establishes that the right to engage in concerted activity
guaranteed by the NLRA "necessarily encompasses the right effectively to
communicate with one another regarding self-organization at the jobsite."90
If employees work in physical proximity to each other and have access to real-
world facilities such as bulletin boards and cafeterias, their right to effective
communication at the jobsite may be fulfilled without network access.9' But
for those employees who are geographically separated because of
84. Id. at 919.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 893 n.4 (limiting remedy to discriminatory prohibition).
87. Such a prohibition runs a serious risk of provoking employee resentment, however, and may not
be in the employer's overall best interest. For example, a 1991 attempt by the Veterans Administration to
prohibit all personal use of the office e-mail met with a swift negative response from the union. See
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Nat'l Veterans Admin. Council, 42 F.L.R.A. 1327 (1991). Although
many private companies have restrictive e-mail policies, they are rarely enforced. See Andrew Jacobs,
Cranking Up the E-mail Business, Employees Discover No-holds Barred Communication, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 21, 1995, at I-1.
88. Morris, supra note 10, at 583-84.
89. See id at 587-89.
90. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978) (emphasis added).
91. Where the employer itself does not communicate with employees by using these meeting rooms
or bulletin boards, but rather relies on e-mail, employees' rights to use the same method would seem to
be strengthened. See id. at 490 (noting employer's use of cafeteria and not locker rooms to communicate
with employees in ascertaining adequate forum for employee communication).
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telecommuting, or who work nonstandard hours, these traditional outlets
provide no solutions. Where the common jobsite is primarily cyberspace,
networks may be the sole medium of effective communication. In such a
situation, an outright ban on all nonwork use of e-mail would prevent
employees from acting collectively and thus would violate the NLRA.
Although employees' ability to communicate must be effective, it need not
be unfettered. As the foregoing review makes clear, in the traditional
workplace, the time and place restrictions on employee exercise of § 7 rights
provide administratively convenient default rules for preserving employees'
ability to communicate effectively with one another while protecting the
employer's right to maintain a disciplined, productive workplace.92 Yet the
tests themselves derive specifically from the paradigm of industrial work in
which they developed. In the next sections, I demonstrate that the fit between
these presumptions and (net)work realities is often poor; if rigidly applied, the
presumptions may have results tantamount to a ban on employee
communication.
A. Examining Nonwork Time
The Supreme Court has declared that "[o]rganization rights are granted to
workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves
[employer] property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained
with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other."93 The restriction of employee communication rights to nonwork time,
first approved in Republic Aviation,94 embodied the Board's experiential
judgment regarding one primary way of striking this balance in the industrial
workplace.
An uncritical application of the nonwork-time presumption to the
(net)workplace would entitle employees to send electronic communications
before and after work, during lunch, or on other breaks. However, this
traditional accommodation will not satisfy employers in the new context of
(net)work. Employers fear that if employees have guaranteed access to e-mail
for labor-related communication, they will inevitably spend work time engaged
in such activity.95 Some employers already limit personal use of intra-office
92. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956); Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945) (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943)).
93. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
94. 324 U.S. at 803 n.10.
95. One practitioner, stating the case against allowing employees to use employer electronic
communications, wrote; "In disseminating information via E-mail, union organizers would be doing so at
the expense of the employer, using employer resources, equipment and time to organize. Moreover, sending
E-mail in order to support union organization further provides a constant and on-going disruption of work
to those receiving the messages." Morris, supra note 10, at 582. This assertion rests on questionable
generalizations. An employee sending or reading electronic communications during her coffee break is not
using company time and thus remains protected, at least under traditional nonwork-time analysis.
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e-mail because of the tendency of some employees to waste time passing
electronic notes back and forth. 96
Moreover, effective monitoring of e-mail abuse is difficult. A casual
observer cannot tell if a person pounding away at his computer is working,
asking a coworker to join his petition for a paternity leave policy, or spreading
gossip. 97 Employers can monitor best by examining the e-mail traffic.
Although such eavesdropping generally falls within an employer's rights,98
it raises substantial privacy concerns even if employers read only the e-mail
headers, which generally contain both the sender's and recipient's addresses
and the time of transmission.99 Privacy rights are beyond the scope of this
Note, but the obvious concerns raised in that area should employers enforce
their right to maintain a disciplined and productive workplace by monitoring
e-mail traffic demonstrate one negative result of applying the traditional
nonwork-time presumption to (net)work. t°°
As an alternative to monitoring, for practical or legal reasons, an employer
might institute a prohibition on electronic communications. Restrictions on
communication during nonwork time may be permitted, however, only if the
employer demonstrates legitimate need.'0 ' The traditional presumption itself
may be viewed as justifying prohibition during work time by establishing that
Furthermore, whether the recipient of the message is disrupted will depend on the configuration of the
system, something that (presumably) will be in the employer's control. Nondisruptive configurations are
discussed in Part IV, infra.
96. Jacobs, supra note 87, at I-I; see also Chiu, supra note 24, at DI, D8 (describing lost productivity
caused by traffic in personal messages). One large law firm instituted a special bulletin board on its LAN
for personal messages. Id.
97. See Jacobs, supra note 87, at I-1 (quoting Solomon Brothers analyst describing greater ease of
disguising gossip on e-mail than of hiding gossip on telephone).
98. The privacy rights at issue in this context have been the subject of extensive debate in both popular
and scholarly publications. Although it is hotly debated, most authors have concluded that current law
favors employers in this matter. See, e.g., Julia Turner Baumhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employee
E-Mail: Protecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8 LAB. LAW. 923 (1992); Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch
Your E-Mail! Employee E-Mail Monitoring and Privacy Law in the Age of the "Electronic Sweatshop,"
28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139 (1994); Steven Winters, Comment, The New Privacy Interest: Electronic Mail
in the Workplace, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 197 (1993); Lois R. Witt, Comment, Terminally Nosy: Are Employers
Free to Access Our Electronic Mail?, 96 DICK. L. REv. 545 (1992); see also RJ. Ignelzi, Under Scrutiny:
E-mail, Phone Calls, Voice Mail Legally Can Be Monitored by Boss, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 3,
1995, at DI; Glenn Rifkin, Do Employees Have a Right to Electronic Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1991.
§ 3 (Business), at 8.
99. It is possible to counterfeit headers on most systems to alter this information. See Elizabeth Weise,
Beware Internet Strangers Bearing "Spoof' E-mail, S.F. EXAMINER, July 17, 1995, at D-6. Counterfeiting
can often be detected by looking at the name of the machine from which the message originates. See id.
(discussing tracing of harassing messages). But see Amy Harmon, Expulsion from Caltech Raises Issue of
E-mail Harassment, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 23, 1995, at All (discussing difficulty of authenticating e-
mail in context of student's expulsion for sending harassing messages that he claims were forged or
altered).
100. Employer surveillance of protected concerted activity might itself violate the NLRA in some
cases. See Automotive Plastic Technologies, 313 N.L.R.B. 462, 463-64 (1993) (explaining circumstances
under which employer observation of union activities violated Act).
101. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber, 167 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1948) (timber company's
need to enforce curfew for lumberjacks justified limit on times union organizer could meet with
employees).
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proof of § 7 communication on company time provides irrebuttable
circumstantial evidence of lost production. But even if the employer
demonstrates the onerousness of monitoring nonwork communications to
discern whether § 7 activities are being conducted on company time, it has not
carried its burden of demonstrating that either production or discipline are
compromised. Thus, the difficulty of monitoring whether or not labor-related
electronic communications are occurring on work time does not justify a ban
where employees' ability to act collectively depends on network
communications.
Why does the nonwork-time presumption fit the (net)workplace so
uneasily? Recall that the nonwork-time presumption was first articulated in
Republic Aviation, a case involving heavy industrial plants. The employees
affected were factory workers. They worked shifts. Their coworkers worked
the same hours they did. They had regular times off for lunch. The hours
before they punched in and after they punched out were clearly their own,
while periods in between belonged to the boss. In this context, the Republic
Aviation Court could cite with approval an NLRB decision dividing the
employment universe and the rules governing it into distinct parts:
Working time is for work. It is therefore within the province of an
employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union
solicitation during working hours .... It is no less true that the time
outside working hours, whether before or after work, or during
luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes
without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is on company
property. It is therefore not within the province of an employer to
promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an
employee outside of working hours, although on company
property. 10 2
Although this bright-line rule serves to ease enforcement, the model of
work on which it is based will not be the paradigm for the next century. In
fact, (net)work is possible because many of the assumptions underlying the
traditional presumptions are frequently no longer true. Service industries do not
require the uniform coordination of assembly lines, so it is not necessary for
all workers to have the same hours. Individual workers, while engaged in a
common project, may operate with substantial autonomy. No longer is the
workday divided neatly into company time and nonwork time: If an employee
sets his own schedule, whether he works this quarter hour and engages in § 7
activity the next or vice versa is irrelevant as long as he works the total time
contracted for. If employees telecommute, there is not even the concern that
102. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945) (quoting Peyton Packing Co.,
49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943)).
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another worker will need to use the computer, desk, or telephone, or that the
company is being forced to keep the office heated and lit for a few late
workers. In many jobs, moreover, time is not the measure of productivity; the
employee is expected to work until the project is done. It is this very trait-the
fact that many employers simply want the work done, as quickly as
possible-that has led some (net)workers to complain of overwork. 3 But
it also means that time's primary relevance is as a means of setting deadlines,
not of measuring output. Thus, for many (net)workers, the nonwork-time
presumption is essentially meaningless.' t 4 Before we consider alternative
visions of labor law that these changes suggests, we should examine the
presumptions governing the location of work and nonwork activities as well.
B. Considering Nonwork Places &
As I discussed above, the traditional presumptions about location depend
on certain common sense assumptions about the nature of different types of
communication. Conversation is intangible, so oral solicitation may
presumptively be conducted anywhere as long as employer time is not
infringed. 0 5 Distribution of written materials, on the other hand, produces
paper debris that can threaten productivity and'even safety, so it must not be
conducted in work areas.10 6  Further limitations on either form of
communication may be justified by demonstrating special needs, often related
to the effect the communication might have on nonemployee hearers107 But
these common sense views derive from traditional workplaces and may not
retain their reasonableness in the (net)workplace.
1. Electronic Communication Is Nondisruptive
One concern justifying the restriction of communication in work
areas-the impact of employee communications on (often) incidental audience
members-is largely inapplicable to (net)workers. Electronic communication
is silent. It will not accidentally be overheard by customers. It is also
103. Verespej, supra note 6, at 50.
104. This assertion is not true for all telecommuters. An individual who works at home, using a
computer and telephone to field customer service inquiries or take mail orders, for example, will be likely
to have a specific shift. In this situation, a division of time similar to the traditional model may remain
appropriate. The very nature of this work-answering customer-initiated inquiries-may prevent e-mail
abuse during work time, especially as the employer might be able to ascertain whether or not employee
communications during the shift correlated with incoming calls.
105. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 617-19 (1962), cited with approval in Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 493 n.10 (1978).
106. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg., 138 N.L.R.B. at 619.
107. See May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976,980-81 (1944) (noting that clerks may be prohibited
from discussing union matters at any time on sales floor where customers might overhear them); Beth Israel
Hosp., 437 U.S. at 503-04 & n.23 (noting hospital workers may be prohibited from leaving pamphlets
discussing their complaints about understaffing in area where patients might read them).
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intangible. It leaves no signs in the real world to attract the curiosity or anger
of consumers, and it does not spontaneously escape the proprietary network to
become accessible to nonemployees. Clients rarely have any access to a
company network, and even where they do, the employer generally controls
access to the system and can ensure that clients do not wander into the
employee communication spaces.
By properly configuring the system, an employer can also minimize the
chance that employees will be distracted by messages. Inherently, the most
common forms of electronic communication eliminate the need for
simultaneity; both e-mail and message base announcements can be sent
whenever the speaker is free, and each recipient will have an opportunity to
respond when she is not working, whether moments or days after the message
is sent. Accordingly, electronic mail will disrupt production only if the system
notifies the employee when a message arrives. If a recipient must check her
own in-box for new mail, the flow of messages will pose no interruption to her
work. Systems also can easily be configured to allow employees to delete
unread messages in their individual mail boxes. In some cases, an employee
may even be able to establish a "kill file" to screen out messages
automatically.'08 If messages are posted to a message base, the employee will
receive no notice that a new message has been sent and need only look at the
messages if she desires. Thus, a good part of the imposition that traditional
communication is assumed to make on employer productivity and discipline
is simply not present with electronic communications.
2. Speech or Distribution?
Leaving aside assumptions about audience reaction to electronic
communication, to apply the traditional location presumptions to employee use
of cyberspace requires us to decide whether electronic communications are
speech or distribution, an exercise that produces no clear answers. Electronic
communication shares qualities of both written and spoken communication, and
its different forms resemble one or the other more closely. "Chat" and real-
time conferencing share the hallmark ephemerality and simultaneity of oral
solicitation. The form on which this Note has primarily concentrated-e-
mail-is enduring, yet it too shares many qualities of speech.
108. Kill files screen by identifying the sender. See DERN, supra note 27, at 213, 218-19. Thus, an
employee who sometimes received necessary, work-related messages from a particular coworker would not
be able to add him to her kill file.
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a. E-mail as Speech
Like speech, e-mail is often informal and individually targeted. But even
where an initial message is neither informal nor personalized, it is still not
merely equivalent to a flyer because e-mail allows the reader to talk back. This
ability to exchange ideas and discuss what action to take collectively is the key
to the effective preservation of labor rights and the equalization of bargaining
power. Conversation provides the opportunity to meet the listener's resistance
point by point as it develops, producing fuller deliberation about issues as well
as a better chance of swaying the skeptic than does the more limited and
formal medium of distribution. Likewise, electronic communication promotes
responsive interchanges, not just an exchange of position papers.
On many systems, the participant reading the contents of a message base
may either post her response in the same, group forum or comment directly to
individuals, including the initial sender. Each person with access to such a
network thus may take the floor at the "public meeting" by posting to the
message base or may engage others in one-on-one discussion. As with speech,
no outlay of employee resources is necessary, ensuring that the message of the
leaders is not the sole one. Such ease of access may also empower the shy to
speak. Thus, electronic communications promote a multiplicity of interchanges
and, on the level of values, resemble speech more than distribution of
literature.
b. E-mail as Distribution
On the other hand, as discussed previously, electronic communications do
not require simultaneity of communication. 109 Thus, like literature, electronic
communications are effective as long as they are received."0 Yet the
traditional presumption limiting distribution to nonwork areas is largely
justified by the physical debris that distribution of printed materials leaves
behind."' Logically, one must ask if network communications "litter"
cyberspace.
The answer may be yes. If employees receive hundreds of messages in the
same directory, some work-related and some not, they will have to spend time
sorting the messages to determine what requires their attention as part of their
work duties. This inundation may be annoying to employees, much as junk
mail is annoying. Indeed, even if the mail itself is welcome, sheer volume can
109. See supra Subsection III.B.I.
110. See Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 620 (1962) (noting that traditional, written
materials are effective if received).
111. Electronic communication also does not share the physical qualities that underpinned the Board's
initial fixation on this distinction. For example, safety concerns, such as the risk of fire when paper debris
accumulates around industrial machinery, are simply not present.
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impede the employer's right to productivity by causing employees to miss
time-sensitive work-related messages or by requiring them to spend time
sorting through nonwork messages. In addition, an extremely large volume of
electronic messages could slow the processing of the entire network, occluding
bandwidth and occupying processors, in turn slowing the processing of data for
all employees, including those not engaged in protected activities. Thus, one
practitioner opposed to employee cyberspace rights has argued: "Just as
employers have the right to curb the distribution of literature in working areas
in the interest of workplace efficiency, so should employers be permitted to




Even if the enduring nature of electronic messages and the potential for
litter that they present result in their classification as distribution, under the
traditional presumption this merely justifies their limitation to nonwork areas.
But do such divisions exist in the geography of cyberspace? If an employer
enforces a uniform ban on nonbusiness messages on its network, has it
established that the entire territory of its cyberspace is a work area? The real-
world analogue to such a space would be a factory with no break rooms,
locker areas, bathrooms, or parking lots--only the work floor. Such a
workplace could not exist because of the physical needs of workers. A
(net)worker satisfies these physical needs too, but in real space, in his home
or at a branch office; the facilities are not part of his (net)workplace. Thus, it
is possible that the only space that he would share with his coworkers is in
fact the cyberspace work area.
This possibility demonstrates another inadequacy of employing the
presumptions developed in an industrial setting to restore equality of
bargaining power in cyberspace. Although controlling the volume of messages
may be the only way of protecting overall network efficiency, allowing a
blanket prohibition of employee electronic communications would run afoul of
the guarantee of effective communication espoused in Beth Israel."3 Since
the severity of the problem will be directly related to the bandwidth of a
specific company's system, a prohibition would be an overinclusive solution
to what may be a phantom concern for many employers. Rather than fixating
on the industrial models for solutions, we must determine how the broad
principles of the NLRA may be fulfilled in the new context of (net)work.
IV. MEANINGFUL RIGHTS
To determine what standards should govern the (net)workplace, we should
remember the NLRA's purpose of establishing an environment for equitable
bargaining between employers and employees. Beth Israel ensures workers'
112. Morris, supra note 10, at 585.
113. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978).
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rights to effective communication, thus ruling out an absolute ban on
(net)workers' electronic communication, but employers may still protect
productivity to the greatest extent compatible with meaningful employee
rights." 4 Therefore, we must consider the characteristics of modem work and
of network communications to understand how employees can engage in
protected § 7 activity without undermining employer productivity. Greater
experience with (net)work in the future may suggest new tests to keep pace
with work realities. For the time being, I suggest that solutions may be found
by making interrelated inquiries into the ways § 7 communications affect both
the individual employee's ability to perform required work and the overall
efficiency of the network.
A. Effects on the Performance of Individual Employees
Employers will want to establish general rules that maximize the output
from each individual (net)worker. If both § 7 and work messages are posted
to an employee's e-mail account, the employee will have to spend time sorting
through her mail in order to find the pressing work messages and may become
distracted from her task. Thus, the simplest measure to promote individual
employee performance while preserving § 7 communication rights is to
segregate work messages from § 7 messages. Creating a work-only account
and another forum for § 7 communications can be likened to defining nonwork
areas under the traditional view."' Partitioning cyberspace would make an
employer's files and directories more organized and thus save employees time
in sorting through the information sent to them. Employers could monitor the
content of work-only accounts without infringing employee privacy rights, and
individuals posting nonwork messages there could be properly subject to
discipline for presumptive impairment of the recipient's performance. If all
§ 7 messages are thus segregated from work messages, the threat that a deluge
of nonwork messages will distract an employee or even make it impossible for
her to locate important work-related messages will be largely eliminated.
Several inherent features of electronic communication also may make it
less likely than traditional communication to harm an individual employee's
performance. As noted above, the removal of the requirement of simultaneity
makes electronic communication less disruptive than traditional
communication." 6 Furthermore, the ability to initiate conversation with many
people using the same message is more efficient than oral solicitation, which
enables one to speak only to those present, necessitating repeated
conversations. But to the extent that an individual employee fails to meet
114. Id. at 491-92.
115. I will discuss the potential forms of such § 7 fora in Section IV.B, infra.
116. See supra Subsection III.B.1.
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employer expectations, despite the restriction of her § 7 activity to a nonwork
forum, existing principles of labor law other than the ill-suited time and place
presumptions allow employers adequate recourse.
Under the general rule of at-will employment, an employee may be fired
for any reason. The NLRA limits this general principle only by preventing the
employer from firing employees because they engage in protected activity. The
employee bears the burden of proving that her conduct protected by § 7 was
a substantial or motivating factor in her discharge." 7 If mixed motives are
alleged, the employer may raise as an affirmative defense that the employee
would still have been fired regardless of any antilabor animus." 8 Thus, for
example, if the employer prohibits nonwork e-mail generally, and the employee
sends a great deal of personal, nonlabor e-mail in addition to messages
protected under § 7, her § 7 activity will not immunize her from dismissal. If,
however, the employer never enforced its general e-mail prohibition, such
firing would constitute discriminatory treatment, presumptively on the basis of
the § 7 conduct.
Perhaps the most difficult situation would arise if an employer were to fire
an employee for failure to meet required productivity levels. An employer
could establish requirements so high that an employee could not meet them
without sacrificing time she otherwise would spend on § 7 activity. If the
employee proved that antilabor animus motivated the work quota-for example
by presenting evidence that work expectations were higher for labor activists,
or by introducing extrinsic evidence of the animus-she would prevail under
general principles prohibiting discrimination against labor." 9 Should she fail
to prove discriminatory reasons for the work level, however, the employee
could likely be dismissed.
In addition to the proscription of antilabor animus, other sources offer
workers some protection from unreasonable work requirements. If the NLRA
is fulfilling its purpose, collective bargaining would shield the employee from
unreasonable employer demands. In addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)'20 limits the number of hours that may be required of many workers
and mandates compensation for overtime.' For workers who have
contracted for a certain number of hours, this will offer substantial protection.
Unfortunately, the invocation of the FLSA is not a perfect solution. Unlike the
NLRA, the FLSA does not apply to professional employees.' These
workers may be especially susceptible to overwork because of constant
117. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400-03 (1983). The employee will
be represented by the NLRB's General Counsel.
118. Id. at 401-02.
119. An employee with the resources of a union behind her would likely have better luck in making
this case than would one acting on her own.
120. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
121. Id. § 207.
122. Id. § 213(a)(1).
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electronic links to their projects, 123 and could benefit from collective action
to negotiate more reasonable work expectations.
In addition to the FLSA, the NLRB itself could exercise its long-dormant
rulemaking powers to promulgate FLSA-type regulations. Even if the Board
took this unlikely step, however, it would be faced with a variety of problems
ranging from its own lack of experience in rulemaking and concomitant lack
of staff for the purpose, to the difficulty of creating a workable standard that
would neither impair employer competitiveness nor deprive employees of the
right to increase their production in return for other benefits. 24 Moreover,
an attempt to avoid these difficulties by a prohibition of unreasonable
production requirements would do little more than duplicate the NLRA's
general prohibition of unfair labor practices. It would provide inadequate
guidance to employers and employees and would again require adjudication to
fill in its substance.
Ultimately, if the (net)workplace is recognized as a legitimate work
environment, existing principles of nondiscrimination will govern in the same
ways that they have in traditional, physical workplaces. In the end,
(net)workers too will have to depend largely upon traditional showings of
animus and the fruits of collective action itself to defend against unfair work
demands. The Board, exercising its adjudicatory power, must be on the lookout
for situations in which employers prevent the meaningful exercise of employee
§ 7 rights through oblique mechanisms such as those described above.
123. See Verespej, supra note 6, at 50, 55 (describing various telecommuters).
124. Scholars have long urged the NLRB to exercise its rulemaking powers more often, in the interests
of fairness and uniformity. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for
Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985); Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the
National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Carl S. Silverman, The Case for the National
Labor Relations Board's Use of Rulemaking in Asserting Jurisdiction, 25 LAB. LJ. 607 (1974). Their
efforts have been to little avail. See Zebrak, supra note 40, at 126-27 (noting that Board has undertaken
only one major rulemaking in last eight years).
Even if the Board did embark upon the APA-dictated series of notice and comment proceedings, there
is a serious risk that the end product would be overly favorable to employers. Unlike individual
adjudications, in which both parties have direct knowledge of the facts and an incentive to participate,
rulemaking relies on voluntary participation. Employers, clearly aware of the stakes, will have a great
incentive to provide information supportive of their rights. Employees who are not already organized,
however, are unlikely to read the Federal Register and may be entirely unaware of the rulemaking
proceedings and their right to participate. Unorganized employees will also lack the resources to mount
comments equal to those put forth by well-heeled industry. It may be left to the unions to oppose industry.
Organized labor has been in decline in recent years, however. In 1955, the AFL-CIO had 12,622,000
paying members in its affiliated unions. DIRECrORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 64 (Courtney D.
Gifford ed., 3d ed. 1986-87). In 1965, the number was 12,919,000, while in 1975 the number swelled to
14,070,000. Id. By 1985, however, the number had again declined to 13,109,000. Id. Between 1979 and
1993, when many unions' membership dropped significantly, the Service Employees Union, benefiting from
some mergers, grew from 537,000 to 919,000 members. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, at 438.
Unless network access is granted, however, this momentum may be hard to sustain as employees
decentralize, so a major achievement of employee access to networks may be to shore up faltering unions.
Thus, the absence of network access that rulemaking would be intended to alleviate could itself impair
employee ability to comment, hampering equitable and effective rulemaking.
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B. Effects on the Network: Overall Productivity
In addition to the effects that § 7 activity may have on a single employee's
production, employers may take action to remedy the collective inefficiencies
of such employee communications. The Board must scrutinize an employer's
remedial actions based on the combined effects of individual productivity
losses particularly carefully; some employer claims rest on empirically
questionable assumptions. One business leader, for example, has claimed that
if 500 employees each take thirty seconds to read a message, the company has
been deprived of 250 minutes of work, or approximately one half of a day's
work for a single employee.125 This conclusion assumes that losses are
additive, a doubtful assertion since a negligible reduction in work by an
individual is unlikely to affect his total production, meaning that overall
company productivity will also appear unaffected. In addition, the segregation
of nonwork from work messages advocated in the preceding section will
minimize the additive effects of such distractions. Nonetheless, excessive
traffic creates other productivity losses by overburdening the technological
capacity of the system.
Ultimately, establishing rules to maintain the balance between employee
communication and the employer's need for efficient and predictable work
patterns will depend greatly on the specifics of system capacity and work type.
Such rules might be a proper subject for negotiation between the parties. Until
accommodations can be agreed upon by contracting parties, however, certain
specific measures suggest themselves to restore the balance of employee and
employer prerogatives.
The easiest and least restrictive mechanism for segregating work and
nonwork messages and thereby controlling traffic levels is to establish a
message base for employee § 7 communication. By encouraging or requiring
employees to post to a message base any communication that many people
receive in identical form, rather than duplicating a message perhaps hundreds
of times to send to individual e-mail boxes, bandwidth is conserved and system
speed protected. 2 6 A message base will also discourage personal nonwork
messages, which pose a greater threat of overuse than protected § 7 messages
even in a unionized workplace. Because of its very publicity, a message base
will be an unlikely forum for gossip, and "netiquette" may be sufficient to
keep the volume of other nonwork messages, such as for-sale notices, to
reasonable levels.
Whether an employer could satisfy the employees' right to communicate
while strictly limiting network access to the use of a special message base
125. Chiu, supra note 24, at D8.
126. See DERN, supra note 27, at 201-02. Creating a message base would also further employees' § 7
right not to communicate. Employees who were not interested in the collective discussion would not be
required to access this space, and they would not find their own digital in-boxes filled with mass mailings.
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remains an open question.127 As Beth Israel clearly indicates, the employer
may only be required to permit the minimum conditions for effective
communication. So long as employees retain the ability to communicate, and
thus to act collectively, the purposes of the NLRA are fulfilled. Collective
dialogue does not seem adequate for effective communication in all situations,
however. For example, where members of a union become dissatisfied with
their bargaining representative, they may wish to discuss alternatives outside
of her hearing. Such discussion is protected by the NLRA.128 In addition, of
course, much of the concerted activity for mutual aid or protection engaged in
outside of the context of labor organizations takes place on a small scale.
Where an employee discusses with a coworker her own perceived maltreatment
by a supervisor to gain support before seeking relief, she may be protected in
the traditional workplace. Logically, if she sends an e-mail to her friend rather
than airs her grievance with the entire workforce through the message base,
she should likewise be protected, regardless of whether the employer has a
blanket prohibition on nonwork use of the e-mail system.
Whether employees have the right to communicate privately-that is, to
voice their concerns to some group smaller than all employees-is a question
that previous cases have not considered. It is a unique possibility of the
(net)workplace that employees might never meet face-to-face, and thus, if the
employer made only an open message base available for communication,
employees would be required either to make all of their discussion open to all
of their fellow workers, or not to engage in it at all. Where official bargaining
units have been established in a workplace, this problem could be mitigated
somewhat by establishing bargaining-unit message bases to provide some less-
public discussion space. An employer-wide message base, accessible to all
interested employees, would remain necessary to allow employees to act in
concert on general issues of concern.
Thus, to preserve (net)workers' rights to engage in other activities for
mutual aid or protection, a total ban on nonwork e-mail use would be
impermissible, at least with respect to § 7 communications between specific
employees. In order to secure to the employer the benefits of limiting messages
to message bases, however, an employer might prohibit employees from
sending messages to a mailing list of people using the e-mail system. This
would prevent an employee from sending copies of the same message to the
individual e-mail accounts of a group of people, cluttering the system, while
127. In a case involving pilots for Federal Express, decided under the Railway Labor Act, the
employer attempted precisely this, restricting all union election information to an electronic bulletin board
and preserving e-mail for business use. See Federal Express Corp., 20 N.M.B. 486, 505-06 (1993).
Traditional means of communication were also available, and the case did not confront the question I raise.
Id.
128. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
(Net)workers' Rights
allowing § 7 use of individual e-mail when the subject of the message is
legitimately private.
Ideally, the employer would create a mechanism for sorting messages
within e-mail accounts or establish one work and one nonwork account for
each employee. As described earlier, the employer could then read the contents
of work accounts to make certain they were being properly used, but
employees would not have to worry that their private § 7 messages would also
be read. Assuming that the employer's policy prohibited all nonwork electronic
communication other than protected § 7 communication, an employer
concerned that employees would hide personal messages in the nonwork
accounts might establish a policy of monitoring the volume of mail in those
accounts. Employees and employers might ultimately bargain over the amount
of traffic allowed in the nonwork account before employer scrutiny is
triggered. 29 If an employee exceeded the traffic limits in her account, the
employer could institute disciplinary action. The employee could rebut the
presumption of e-mail abuse, however, if she revealed the contents of her
account to an arbitrator or other neutral party and proved that they were
legitimate § 7 communications. Thus, the combination of dual e-mail accounts
and message bases would protect employee communication rights while
allowing employers to control traffic and maintain productivity.
31
CONCLUSION
Because the drafters of the NLRA could not anticipate all the factual
variables to which the Act would have to apply, they left the task of fulfilling
its purposes to the National Labor Relations Board and the courts. In the
decades since its passage, these institutions have developed convenient
methods for executing the NLRA, based on practical experience with work
realities that would have been familiar to the Act's authors. Emerging
technologies are radically reshaping the landscape of work, however, and they
demand rethinking of the methods developed for achieving legislative values.
Perhaps the changes engendered by electronic communications will one day
necessitate a new statute to govern the negotiation of work relations. Today,
however, the NLRA stands as the primary guarantor of (net)workers' rights,
and despite changed contexts, the NLRA is not ill-suited to the task. By
keeping in mind the underlying purpose of the Act-to protect meaningful
communication among employees for the purposes of mutual aid and
129. As network carriage capabilities increase, the impact of genuine § 7 messages on network
efficiency will probably be minimal because their number is likely to remain low.
130. Of course, whenever an employer takes disciplinary action against the employee, for example
because of individual use of the e-mail system, the employee must be aware of his § 7 rights in order to
exercise them. Ensuring electronic communications for employees of the same company will not solve the
basic difficulty for effectiveness of the NLRA-making certain that employees are aware of their rights.
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protection-and by taking the idea of cyberspace as a place of work seriously,
we can preserve and perhaps reinvigorate labor rights for the (net)worker.
Embracing new contexts, we can maintain fundamental fidelity to the values
of the NLRA.
